Ruling 1759. When one makes the intention to perform an iʿtikāf that is not an assigned obligation,[1] he can stipulate a condition from the outset that if a problem arises, he will leave the iʿtikāf.[2] Therefore, by stipulating such a condition, one can leave the iʿtikāf if a problem arises, and there is no problem in doing so even on the third day. However, if a muʿtakif stipulates a condition that he will stop his iʿtikāf even if no particular reason arises, the validity of such a condition is problematic [i.e. based on obligatory precaution, it is not a valid condition]. It is worth mentioning that stipulating the aforementioned condition (i.e. the condition of leaving the iʿtikāf in the middle of it if a problem arises) before or after the iʿtikāf has started is not correct; rather, it must be stipulated at the time of making the intention to perform iʿtikāf.

Ruling 1760. A valid iʿtikāf is not conditional on one having reached the age of legal responsibility (bulūgh), and iʿtikāf performed by a child who is able to discern between right and wrong (mumayyiz) is also correct.

Ruling 1761. If a muʿtakif sits on a usurped (ghaṣbī) carpet and he is aware of the fact that it is usurped, he commits a sin but his iʿtikāf does not become invalid. If someone gets to a place first and reserves it and a muʿtakif takes his place without his consent, then although he commits a sin, his iʿtikāf is valid.

Ruling 1762. If at the time of making the intention for an obligatory iʿtikāf one stipulates a condition of returning (i.e. a condition of leaving the iʿtikāf in the middle of it if a problem arises) – the details of which were mentioned in Ruling 1759 – in the event that he does something that is unlawful for one to do during iʿtikāf, it is not necessary for him to make up the iʿtikāf nor to start it all over again.

Ruling 1763. If a woman who is performing iʿtikāf becomes ḥāʾiḍ after the completion of the second day of iʿtikāf, it is obligatory for her to leave the mosque immediately. And based on obligatory precaution, it is necessary for her to make up the iʿtikāf unless from the outset she had stipulated a condition of returning (i.e. a condition of leaving the iʿtikāf in the middle of it if a problem arises), the details of which were mentioned in Ruling 1759.

Ruling 1764. Performing an obligatory qaḍāʾ iʿtikāf is not an immediate obligation (al‑wājib al‑fawrī).[3] However, making it up must not be delayed to such an extent that it would be regarded as being careless in accomplishing the obligation. And the recommended precaution is that it should be made up immediately.

Ruling 1765. If a muʿtakif dies in the middle of an iʿtikāf that has become obligatory on account of a vow, oath, covenant, or the passing of two days of iʿtikāf, it is not obligatory for his guardian (walī) (i.e. the eldest son) to make up the qaḍāʾ iʿtikāf, although the recommended precaution is that a qaḍāʾ iʿtikāf of a deceased person should be performed. Of course, in the event that a muʿtakif had stipulated in his will that in such a case someone must be hired from the one-third of his estate[4] to perform iʿtikāf for him, then the deceased muʿtakif’s will must be followed.

Ruling 1766. If a muʿtakif intentionally invalidates his iʿtikāf by having sexual intercourse – be it during the day or at night – it is obligatory for him to give recompense (kaffārah). As for [intentionally invalidating one’s iʿtikāf by performing] other unlawful acts, there is no kaffārah, although the recommended precaution is that one should give kaffārah.

The kaffārah for invalidating an iʿtikāf is the same as the kaffārah for invalidating a fast of the month of Ramadan – i.e. one has the choice of fasting for sixty days or feeding sixty poor people (fuqarāʾ) – although the recommended precaution is that one should observe the sequence in giving kaffārah, meaning that one should first fast for sixty days, and if he cannot, he should then feed sixty poor people.

Ruling 1767. It is not permitted to change from one iʿtikāf to another, whether both iʿtikāfs happen to be obligatory, like when a person has made one of them obligatory on account of a vow and the other on account of an oath; or, both are recommended; or, one is obligatory and the other recommended; or, one is to be performed for himself and the other on behalf of someone else (niyābah), or he is being hired to perform it for someone else; or, both are to be performed on behalf of someone else.